Knife-Edge: Understanding the Complexity of Acquittal

A: Let’s start by pinpointing the real issue in R v Nasir Al‑Shumari. The central question was whether evidence of the appellant’s so-called ‘bad character’ could be admitted, specifically under section 101(1)(e) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Now—that gateway only opens if the evidence has substantial probative value to an important matter between co-defendants. Here, that was the identity of the knifeman, right?

B: So, just to clarify… this bad character stuff—does it mean any past misdeeds could suddenly be used against someone in trial, or is there a pretty high bar? Like, what actually counts as ‘substantial probative value’?

A: Good question. The threshold is high. Not every prior scrape or rumour gets in. For instance, in this case, three specific incidents were allowed: bringing an eight-inch breadknife to school in 2020, threatening to stab a student that same year, and an Instagram message about buying a knife—sent just months after the fatal stabbing in 2023. The judge had to decide: do these show a real tendency to carry or provide knives, and does that genuinely help the jury untangle whether the appellant or D2 was the knifeman?

B: But what stops a co-defendant from just digging up every minor incident to throw shade on someone they’re up against in the dock? Wouldn’t that get messy—and unfair—really fast?

A: Exactly, and that’s where careful control comes in. The judge leaned on comparators like R v Braithwaite and R v Miller, where material that couldn’t actually be proven—or was pure suspicion—was kept out. Here, the knife at school and Instagram message were verifiable, either by staff confiscation or digital records. The jury was even directed not to use this evidence against the appellant for the prosecution’s case—just for co-defendants trying to clear their own names.

B: Wait, so the jury was basically told, “You can think about this bad character stuff, but only for certain defendants’ stories, not for the main prosecution case”? That sounds… complicated. Do juries really manage that?

A: You’re right—it demands mental discipline. But trial judges craft specific directions to ring-fence how evidence can be used. In this case, they emphasized: don’t let the bad character taint your view of the appellant overall, especially since the prosecution didn’t rely on it. And appellate courts are slow to second-guess those directions unless there’s a glaring error or the evidence is obviously too weak.

B: So where did this all land for Al‑Shumari? Did the Court of Appeal think the jury was misled or that admitting those incidents tipped the scales unfairly?

A: Ultimately, they upheld the conviction. The judges said these specific bits of bad character evidence genuinely helped resolve the live dispute between co-defendants on who brought or used the knife, and there were clear directions preserving fairness. No procedural ground was pursued on appeal; verdicts were found safe. It’s a sharp lesson in how nuanced—and procedural—the bad character gateway can be when the stakes are this high.